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Abstract. Using dedicated hardware is common practice in order to
accelerate cryptographic operations: complex operations are managed
by a dedicated co-processor and RAM/crypto-engine data transfers are
fully managed by DMA operations. The CPU is therefore free for other
tasks, which is vital in embedded environments with limited CPU power.
In this work we discuss and benchmark XTS-AES, using either software
or mixed approaches, using Linux and dm-crypt, and a low-power At-
mel(tm) board. This board featurs an AES crypto-engine that supports
ECB-AES but not the XTS-AES mode. We show that the dm-crypt
module used in Linux for full disk encryption has limitations that can be
relaxed when considering larger block sizes. In particular we demonstrate
that performance gains almost by a factor two are possible, which opens
new opportunities for future use-cases.
Keywords: Full disk encryption, XTS-AES, encryption, decryption, atmel
board, linux kernel crypto API, scatterlist, DMA.
1 Introduction
Data confidentiality has become an essential aspect in our society, and in par-
ticular Full Disk Encryption (FDE). Smartphones use FDE to protect users’
data, and all modern operating systems can offer encrypted partitions, as an
option during installation. Since the whole device is encrypted, nobody is able
to distinguish encrypted data from random data.
The FDE of hard drives and USB sticks can be done using different tools.
Linux, since kernel version 2.6, includes a dm-crypt module which is a device
mapper for transparent encryption and decryption and is therefore a key com-
ponent for FDE. In that context, the most recent and suitable cipher for block-
oriented storage devices is AES in XTS mode, which is recommended by NIST
[4]. However not every crypto-engine, even when it features a specific AES en-
gine, natively supports the XTS-AES mode since this is a relatively recent as
well as a complex mode. In our case we focussed on an embedded Atmel board,
the SAMA5D3, featuring a cortex A5@536 MHz CPU, 256 MB of RAM, and a
crypto-engine that supports the ECB-AES mode (among other modes) but not
XTS-AES mode.
Our first contribution consists in adding XTS-AES support through a mixed
hard/soft implementation that leverages the ECB-AES crypto-engine.
Then benchmarks demonstrated that the performance achieved under these
conditions were far from good and in particular did not match our own objective
of on-the-fly encryption of large amounts of data within the Atmel board. We
investigated and found that dm-crypt is limited to block sizes that are hard-coded
to 512 bytes because it is also the common logical sector size on most devices. For
historical reasons and backward compatibility this limit has never been changed.
We therefore explored the possibility of having requests significantly larger than
512 bytes, in particular 4 KB long requests.
Our second contribution consists in exploring the modifications of dm-crypt
and the underlying Atmel AES drivers required in order to support longer en-
cryption/decryption requests.
Finally our tests turned out to be extremely efficient for the mixed XTS-
AES mode implementation and full hardware implementation. A performance
gain almost of a factor two was observed by moving to 4 KByte compared to
the original 512 byte version.
Our third contribution consists in a benchmark of the various XTS-AES
implementations with extended requests, showing major performance gains that
open the opportunity for new use-cases with low-power, embedded boards.
2 Related works
FDE and XTS-AES have been considered in several previous works. However
almost none discuss dm-crypt performance. Several papers analysed the security
aspects of FDE like Casey et al. in 2011[3] or Henson et al. in 2013[6]. Gotzfried
et al.[5] focused on Android FDE and developed a tool to show that with physical
access to an encrypted smartphone only (i.e., without user level privileges), the
Android system partition can be subverted with keylogging. Other works from
Müller et al.[8] in the same way have developed a tool to perform cold boot
attack and retrieve sensitive data from RAM.
XTS mode is approved by NIST for block oriented storage devices[4]. A
detailed presentation is described in[7]. Alomari et al.[2] give details of a parallel
XTS implementation in multiple cores which enhances performance by 90 %.
Shakil [1] presents an implementation on FPGA.
3 Background: Full Disk Encryption, dm-crypt,
XTS-AES and crypto-engines
3.1 Block Devices and Full Disk Encryption (FDE)
A block device is an abstraction required to access such hardware devices as
hard drives that provide buffered access to the device. However, the notion of
”block” is sometimes misleading and two types of ”blocks” exist:
– the physical sector on a disk, which is the fundamental unit of all block
devices. The size of those blocks, on most devices, is 512 bytes;
– the logical block, which is an abstraction of the file system and corresponds
to the smallest logically addressable unit. The usual values are 512, 1024 and
4096 bytes.
In this work, we also consider Full Disk Encryption (or FDE), i.e., an en-
cryption of the underlying block device. FDE is now popular, including with
smartphones that often natively encrypt their user/data partitions (e.g., An-
droid relies on a dm-crypt module). Initially, the encryption of block devices
was based on the CBC-AES mode. However NIST proposed to move to a new
standard, XTS-AES mode in [4] and new FDE (e.g., Filevault2 for MacOS) all
moved to this new cipher. XTS-AES is significantly more complex than CBC-
AES, but it has two key advantages: it can be parallelized and it works natively
on such fixed data units as blocks. These features make XTS-AES well suited to
block device ciphering.
3.2 LUKS/dm-crypt
In Linux, the dm-crypt kernel module is used to create encrypted containers
and is available since version 2.6. dm-crypt is implemented as a device mapper
target, i.e., it provides transparent encryption of block devices using the kernel
crypto API. Each data read from the device is decrypted and conversely each
data written to the device is encrypted before being stored on the disk. The
kernel crypto API offers a rich set of cryptographic ciphers as well as other
data transformation mechanisms and methods to invoke them. For the sake of
universality, the kernel crypto ciphers are software based (i.e., the CPU performs
all the encryption/decryption operations). An existing hardware crypto-engine
will not be used by default, unless a dedicated low level driver for that module
exists and replaces the software methods with its own hardware accelerated
methods. Figure 1 presents a high-level overview of the global architecture.
Two tools exist to create the device mapper target. The first one, dmsetup,
offers a low-level interface and must be used by experienced users only. Data is
directly encrypted and managed by the user, all the parameters (key included)
being provided as command line arguments.
The second tool is more user-friendly and is based on LUKS (Linux Unified
Key Setup). LUKS creates a header on the disk with all the required information
such as the cipher mode, the salt and the hash of the master key. Moreover LUKS
allows to have up to 8 users per container. A key is then derived from the user
passphrase with PBKDF2 and is used to encrypt or decrypt the master key. dm-
crypt supports different ciphers but the most recent default mode is XTS-AES.
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Fig. 2: XTS-AES encryption process
3.3 About the XTS-AES mode
The XTS-AES mode is not included in all embedded boards, essentially because
this is a relatively recent mode of operation that is a relatively complex (it in-
volves two ECB-AES encryptions, a multiplication in a Galois Field, and two
XOR operations). This mode has been designed to work with fixed-size data
units, for instance logical disk blocks, and each data unit must be processed sep-
arately and independently of other data units. When applied to a block device,
this feature implies that the computations required to modify the content of a
block of a fully encrypted device will be localized to this block, without any
impact on the adjacent blocks. This is a key asset when compared to modes that
rely on a chaining approach.
Three components are necessary to implement XTS-AES:
K: a key that is divided into two equal-sized sub-keys, K1 and K2. K1 is used
to encrypt/decrypt data while K2 is used for IV encryption;
IV: a 128 bit/16 byte value that represents the logical position of the data unit.
This IV, once encrypted, is called tweak in XTS-AES;
P: a 512 byte data unit that is used as the payload to encrypt or decrypt.
Let us consider a 512 bytes block. It is composed of 32 data units of 128
bits/16 bytes each. Let j denote the sequential number of the 128 bit data unit
inside the block. Fig 2 shows the encryption process for such a data unit. The
first step consists in encrypting the IV with K2 using the AES-ECB mode. The
result is multiplied (in the Galois field) with the jth power of α to produce T ,
where α is a primitive element of GF(2128). Then the 128 bit data unit (plaintext)
is XORed with T and encrypted with K1 using AES-ECB mode, resulting in
CC. The last step consists in XORing the output CC with T , producing the
encrypted result for this 128 bit data unit. The same operation is performed for
all the 128 bit data units, successively.
A pseudo code is shown in Algo. 1. It relies on two functions:
computeTweak(IV ): computes 32 tweaks from an encrypted IV (eIV ), using
the multiplication in the Galois Field;
AESEncECB(P , K): encryption of plaintext P with key K to produce ci-
phertext C. This function uses the ECB-AES cryto engine.
4 Implementation of extended request for XTS-AES
We designed and benchmarked two XTS-AES drivers:
– a version that leverages the hardware assisted ECB-AES, mixed with soft-
ware multiplications on the Galois field and software XOR operations. This
version operates on data chunks limited to 512 bytes;
– an optimized version of this driver and the dm-crypt component, where the
data chunks are extended to 4 kilo-bytes.
These XTS-AES drivers will be compared to the original full-software XTS-AES
function of the Linux kernel crypto API, used as the reference.
4.1 Support of XTS-AES mode with hardware assisted ECB-AES
operations
The Atmel driver does not natively support the XTS-AES mode. However, as
seen in Section 3.3, XTS-AES is composed of two ECB-AES operations that are
supported by the crypto-engine of our Atmel SAMA5D3 board. Therefore, we de-
signed a first version of the XTS-AES encryption function, atmel aes xts encrypt(),
making use of the ECB-AES hardware crypto-module, as illustrated in Algo.1.
Since dm-crypt is left unchanged in this version, the data chunks managed by
the XTS-AES Atmel driver are still limited to 512 bytes.
4.2 Addition of the extended request mode to the Atmel XTS-AES
driver
Then, we modified the Atmel XTS-AES driver and dm-crypt in order to relax
the 512 byte limit. Because the extended mode handles larger requests, we added
the following function to the Atmel XTS-AES driver:
generateIVs(IV , nblocks): generates nblocks IVs by incrementing each previ-
ous IV by one. This is required since we receive a single IV , corresponding
to the first block. The maximum size of IVs table is 128 bytes (i.e., 8 × 16
bytes).
The new algorithm, implemented in the new atmel aes xts encrypt() function,
is described in Algo.2. We see that:
– the first encryption operation, AESEncECB(IV s,K1), is performed on a
single chunk of up to 128 bytes of data;
– the second encryption operation, AESEncECB(PP,K2), is performed on a
single chunk of 4 KB.
This has to be compared to applying Algo. 1 8 times, for each chunk of 512 bytes
contained in the 4 KB block. We see that significant improvements should be
achieved from this optimization.
Algorithm 1: XTS-AES encryp-
tion, atmel aes xts encrypt().
input : key split in (K1 ‖ K2);
IV (16B);
plaintext P (512B);
output: ciphertext C (512B)
1 eIV ← AESEncECB (IV, K1)
// tw buf is a 512-byte buffer
// that contains 32 16-byte
// tweaks
2 tw buf ← computeTweak (eIV)
3 PP ← tw buf ⊕ P
4 CC ← AESEncECB (PP, K2)
5 C ← tw buf ⊕ CC
Algorithm 2: Modified at-
mel aes xts encrypt() with ex-
tended requests.
input : key split in (K1 ‖ K2);
IV (16B);
plaintext P (multiple
of 512B);
output: ciphertext C
1 nblocks ← sizeof (P)/ 512
2 IVs← generateIVs (IV, nblocks)
3 eIVs ← AESEncECB (IVs, K1)
// tw buf is a buffer that
// contains 32 × nblocks
// 16-byte tweaks
4 for i← 0 to nblocks do
5 tw buf [i× 512] ←
computeTweak (eIVs [i× 16])
6 PP ← tw buf ⊕ P
7 CC ← AESEncECB (PP, K2)
8 C ← tw buf ⊕ CC
4.3 Addition of extended requests to dm-crypt
When the kernel decides that a set of blocks must be transferred to or from a
block I/O device, it uses a bio structure to describe this operation. Then data is
transferred to the low level driver (atmel-aes) with a scatterlist. In the following
we will briefly explain each structure in order to understand how we improved
the original performance.
Data is first gathered in a bio structure as shown in Figure 3. This is as a
list of segments, where each segment is a chunk of a buffer that is contiguous
in memory. However, individual buffers need not be contiguous in memory. This
data structure allows to perform block I/O operations as a single buffer from
multiple locations in memory. The first segment is pointed by the bio io vec
field. Structures are then stored as an array of bio vec structures. Each bio vec
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is treated as a vector of the form <page, offset, len> where page denotes the
associated physical page, length denotes the data size starting from the offset in
the page. Another field in the bio structure is bio next which is a pointer to a
new bio (block I/O could be stored as a chained list of bio structures).
To achieve high performance I/O, the use of Direct Memory Access (DMA)
is needed. With DMA the I/O device transfers data to or from memory without
intervention of CPU. However, in order to perform as a single operation data
needs to be stored contiguously in memory. This is done thanks to an array of
scatterlist structures. Each structure (called segment) is very similar to a bio vec
and is composed of three fields <page, offset, len>. An additional field is the
dma address which is an address given to the peripheral. We call sg list the array
of scatterlists as in the Figure 4. One can create sg list directly but the allocation
should be done by hand or through a sg table. The sg list must fit within a
single page, which limits the number of segments to PAGE SIZE/sizeof(struct
scatterlist). As a result an sg table could be composed of a chained list of sg list
for large I/O.
The last step is the relation between both structures: bio and scatterlist.
The link between both is made in the dm-crypt module. Figure 5 illustrates
this transfer. As we have seen, the main data size in memory is the page size.
Each page has been described as segments. Segments are involved within bio
and scatterlist. The first step is to retrieve a single page of a bio through bio vec.
Then (step 2) two scatterlists (only one is represented) are initialized for source
and destination with each one a single segment (one page). The set page function
fills the scatterlist with the page pointed by the bio vec starting from offset 0
and with a data size of 512 bytes. The third step is to create a dm-crypt request
with some information about data to encrypt or decrypt and the recently created
scatterlists. The fourth step is to send the request to atmel-aes driver in order
to process it.
Thus, to process a single 4096 bytes page, steps 2, 3 and 4 are executed
8 times (offset is incremented by 512 each time). After the completion of the
current page, the next page is retrieved from the bio (step 1) and is treated in
the same manner.
Algorithm 3: Legacy
crypt convert().
input :
# bytes to transfer, nbytes;
initial sector number, sec;
sector shift size, sec shift;
(sec shift is hard coded as 512B)
plaintext, in;
ciphertext, out;
1 rem ← nbytes
2 while rem > 0 do
// sec is used as IV below
3 cryptConvertBlock (sec,
sec shift, in, out)
4 sec ← sec + 1
5 rem ← rem − sec shift
Algorithm 4: Modified
crypt convert() with extended
requests.
input :
# bytes to transfer, nbytes;
initial sector number, sec;
sector shift size, sec shift;
plaintext, in;
ciphertext, out;
1 rem ← nbytes
2 while rem > 0 do
3 if rem > 4096 then
4 sec shift ← 4096
5 else
6 sec shift ← rem
// sec is used as IV below
7 cryptConvertBlock (sec,
sec shift, in, out)
8 sec ← sec + sec shift/512
9 rem ← rem − sec shift
This transfer is done in particular thanks to two functions: crypt convert
and crypt convert block. Algo. 3 shows an extremely simplified version of the
first function.
When a I/O block request is handled by dm-crypt, it eventually goes to
crypt convert which iterates through the bio structure and runs a block encryp-
tion on the associated plaintext. In this method, remaining is the remaining size
of data to encrypt from in to out, sector shift is the offset for the next block,
and req is the request generated from the variables mentioned before. This en-
cryption is handled by the crypt convert block method which first of all transfers
data pointer (page) into a single scatterlist of 512 bytes, and this scatterlist is
then encrypted/decrypted by the appropriate cipher (XTS-AES in our case).
As we see, the main problem is that the actual solution is based on a specific
sector shift which is used to iterate by 512 bytes blocks. What we need to do
then is changing this behavior by adding the ability to use 4096 bytes blocks,
which is supposed to be the optimal block size due to scatterlists page size which
is 4096 bytes as well. However to ensure backward compatibility and for other
bio_vec
*bv_page
bv_len
bv_offset
scatterlist
page_link
offset
Length (512) 
dma_address
single page
split - into 8 
512 bytes 
blocks - by 
dm-crypt
skcipher_request
unsigned int cryptlen
u8 *iv
struct scatterlist *src
struct scatterlist *dst
struct crypto_async_request base
Atmel aes driver
1
2
3
1st 2nd 8th 
4
Fig. 5: From bio to scatterlist
specific reasons, like handling the last block of a request if it does not have a
size multiple of 4096, we still need to handle 512 bytes blocks.
To do so, we change the sector shift that should be equal to 4096 if the
remaining data to encrypt is greater or equal to 4096, and should be equal to
the remaining otherwise. Therefore, we replace:
sector shift = 512
by:
sector shift ← (remaining > 4096) ? 4096 : remaining
(see Algo. 4).
Therefore the previous way of splitting data into scatterlists is totally changed.
For instance, if dm-crypt receives a 8192 bytes plaintext to encrypt, it will be
split into two completely filled scatterlists instead of sixteen scatterlists filled
only with 512 bytes of actual data. As mentioned before, we have chosen a block
size of 4096 bytes because it natively corresponds to the page size.
5 Experiments
5.1 Test Procedure
The Atmel SAMA5D3-XPlained board is equipped with a cortex A5 @536 MHz,
256 MB of RAM, a 16 GB class 10 SD card, and runs the Linux 4.6.0-sama5-
armv7-r1. It also uses cryptsetup version v1.6.6. For conveniency purposes, the
dm-crypt module and atmel-aes driver are both compiled as modules. The test
procedure is the following:
1. create a file container of 1.5 GB with the dd command;
2. create a LUKS container with the following parameters:
– cipher is aes-xts-plain;
– key is 256 bits/32 bytes long.
3. create an EXT4 file system in this container and fill it with test files of
different sizes;
4. close then reopen the container;
5. measure the time used to compute the MD5sum of the target file;
6. close the container;
7. perform 10 times this open/compute MD5sum/close test.
This test protocol has been chosen to avoid cache problems and to be sure to
measure the right time.
5.2 ECB-AES Raw Results
The results in Figure 6 highlight the impact of block size on performance of ECB-
AES mode (rather than XTS-AES). ECB-AES is the simplest mode (without
IV), it allows us to point out the potential improvements. We clearly notice that
the maximum performance is reached when using a 4 KB block size. Figure 7
shows the time required to encrypt a block. To retrieve the time speed in the
encryption or decryption step, we added two high-precision getnstimeofday()
functions. The first one is located in the mapping function before the DMA
transfer, the second one is after the DMA interruption when data is retrieved
from the DMA.
The results show that the time needed to compute a single 4 KB block is
significantly lower than the time required to compute eight blocks of 512 bytes.
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5.3 XTS-AES Results
We now compare the performance of the three versions considered in this work:
– the software kernel crypto implementation;
– the atmel-aes driver with our hardware assisted XTS-AES mode (Section 4.1);
– the atmel-aes driver with our hardware assisted XTS-AES mode and ex-
tended requests (Section 4.2).
We focus on the decryption time, measured through the MD5 hash. Using a hash
of the file allows us to be sure that the whole file content has been decrypted
and read, while verifying its integrity.
Figure 8 confirms with XTS-AES mode that the extended request approach is
highly efficient. This optimization is in fact mandatory to unleash the potential
of crypto-engines. The improvement factor is close to 2 between the original
atmel-aes driver/dm-crypt and the new one. This result confirms those achieved
with ECB-AES.
6 Conclusion
In this work we proposed an approach to take full advantage of the cryptographic
engine of an Atmel board running Linux. The original dm-crypt module has been
patched to increase the size of the request sent to the atmel-aes driver. It enabled
our implementation to enhance performance almost by a factor of 2 compared
to the original version. These improvements are valid with the XTS-AES mode
as well as the ECB-AES mode, as well as other hardware crypto-engines using
dm-crypt with limited changes in their native drivers.
1MB
2MB
3MB
4MB
8MB
10MB
20MB
30MB
100MB
200MB
300MB
500MB
0.000
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
8.000
9.000
MD5 hash speed of local encrypted files
With ExtReq
Original atmel driver
Software
File size (MB)
B
a
n
d
w
ith
 (
M
iB
/s
)
Fig. 8: XTS-AES decryption performance W.R.T. the file size, for the 3 versions.
References
1. S. Ahmed, K. Samsudin, A. R. Ramli, and F. Z. Rokhani. Effective implementation
of aes-xts on fpga. In TENCON 2011 - 2011 IEEE Region 10 Conference, pages
184–186, Nov 2011.
2. M. A. Alomari, K. Samsudin, and A. R. Ramli. A parallel xts encryption mode of
operation. In Research and Development (SCOReD), 2009 IEEE Student Conference
on, pages 172–175, Nov 2009.
3. Eoghan Casey, Geoff Fellows, Matthew Geiger, and Gerasimos Stellatos. The grow-
ing impact of full disk encryption on digital forensics. Digital Investigation, 8(2):129
– 134, 2011.
4. M Dworkin. Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation: The xts-aes mode
for confidentiality on storage devices,” national institute of standards and technol-
ogy. Technical report, Tech. Rep. 800-38E, 2010.[Online]. Available: http://csrc.
nist. gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E. pdf.
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